Abstract-We explore a new stage in the evolution of digital trust, trusting strangers with your funds. We address the trust issues when giving money to others and relying on them to forward it. For fraud identification, we leverage our deployed blockchain which gradually builds trust between interacting strangers. Our blockchain fabric, called TrustChain, records interactions between entities in a scalable manner. This work represents a small step towards a generic infrastructure for trust, moving beyond proven single vendor platforms like eBay, Uber and Airbnb.
I. INTRODUCTION
Creating trust between strangers is at the core of numerous successful Internet companies. Starting 22 years ago, Craigslist offered an unmoderated mailing list of advertisements and gossip on which buyer and seller could be trusted. eBay formalised this in 1997 and introduced a star-based rating system that enables traders to build a trustworthy profile [1] . The ecommerce platform was launched at a time when people were still hesitant to use their credit card on a technology called The Internet. Nowadays, people let strangers sleep in their houses using Airbnb (since 2008). We trust Uber (since 2009) with our physical security and get into cars late at night with a driver that has never undergone a criminal background check or given a government license. These influential milestones in the evolution of digital trust are shown in Figure 1 .
We continue this evolution of building trust. We created an operational platform for one of the most challenging and sensitive applications, having others handle your money.
Bitcoin created money without the need for banks [2] . In the past, people were required to trust a central bank and a host of other intermediaries when making payments [3] . The fundamental technology of Bitcoin, blockchain, radically reduced the need to trust financial middlemen. It bootstrapped an economy where no one can be stopped from spending their money. Despite widespread speculation and ecosystems being worth billions, blockchain in general suffers from scalability issues due to inefficient mechanisms for fraud prevention. Bitcoin is theoretically limited to seven transactions per second and Ethereum has a throughput of around 20 transactions per second [4] . Despite various scalability efforts like proof-ofstake and sharding, broader adoption of blockchain stays out.
While a majority of Internet users trust the company behind popular platforms, the events involving Mt. Gox highlighted how digital trust can be established and compromised [5] . Mt. Gox was at one point the largest Bitcoin exchange worldwide. In 2014, hackers stole Bitcoin, worth around $460 million at that time. This event, together with major data breaches in 2017 at high-profile companies like Uber and Equifax, exposed the weakness of centralized architectures [6] . They motivate research around decentralized technologies, like blockchain.
The generic problem of building trust between strangers resides on the edge of technology, sociology and behavioural science [7] . The question whether someone can be trusted, depends on properties like personality, level of authority, culture and past behaviour. In this research, we address the trust problem from a technological perspective, using tamperproof interactions on a scalable blockchain. This structure is built to detect fraudulent behaviour and misrepresentation. We explore whether a trust model based merely on historical encounters is sufficient to trust strangers with your money.
With established trust relations, we demonstrate how one can transfer money within seconds between different banks by relying on others to act as financial intermediaries. In comparison to most proven platforms, our solution is designed to be fully decentralized and autonomous. Our work is motivated by slow money transfers to other banks using existing systems. Inter-banking payments often take up to a day or even a few days during weekends to arrive in the account of a beneficiary.
The main contributions of this work are as follows: 1) A trust model, based on repeated interactions and stored on a tamper-proof, scalable blockchain. 2) Internet-of-Money, a novel overlay network that allows real-time money routing to other banks. 3) Experimental quantification of the performance of our trust model, the speed of money transfers and the efficiency of our overlay network. 4) A framework to interface with multiple banks and to initiate payments to others using Internet-of-Money.
To determine trust scores, we use an algorithm which has been studied extensively in related work, personalised PageRank [18] . The algorithm assigns a score between 0 and 1 to each node in G. These scores are used to pick intermediaries for money forwarding (see Section VI). We consider the node in G that performs the computation as trusted source. Using a reputation algorithm based on random walks is attractive due to its high scalability and low computational complexity. However, one might consider using a reputation algorithm based on maximum network flow to compute trust scores. In particular, we believe the Bazaar algorithm is suitable for this use case and provides additional security at the cost of increased computational requirements [19] .
Preventing 2 library is currently being tested. Money Routers: Each money routers must offer settlement services with at least two different bank accounts. Having many money routers in the network directly benefits availability and load balancing. A study conducted by NGData indicated that 37.7% of the respondents held accounts at different banks and are able to act as settlement intermediary for money transfers [23] . To create incentives for users to operate a money router, we include transaction fees. Transaction fees can be either fixed, defaulting to e0.01, or a percentage of a fast payment volume. These fees are necessary to cover costs enforced by banks when initiating cross-border payments or when using business accounts to route money. In addition, users can specify a minimum account balance to avoid taking costs when their balance becomes negative. In the remainder of this work, we assume transaction fees are fixed. We also consider an analysis of monetary incentives out of scope and not fundamental for the prototype evaluated in this work.
Note that our design also allows the role of money router to be fulfilled by a single trusted third party or by a few selected trustworthy entities (i.e. financial institutions). A more centralized architecture would mitigate some of the trust and security issues that arise from full decentralization. However, we consider open enrollment (the opportunity for any user to act as a money router) a cardinal property of our system.
Router Discovery: We designed a gossip protocol for discovery of available money routers, based on utility. Like all our proposed infrastructure, it does not depend on any server, company, or other central entity. If Alice wishes to discover a new router, she asks one of her known peers, say Bob, to introduce a router to her. Now, Bob tries to introduce a router to Alice through which she can route money. In general, the algorithm prioritizes routers that provide the most benefit to Alice. If Bob has no router in his set of known peers that are able to provide new services to Alice, he will introduce a random router to Alice. Repeating this gossiping protocol quickly converges to a network with connections between individuals able to provide routing services for each other. An evaluation of this mechanism is given in Section VII-B.
Building a Money Circuit: Prior to transferring money, an initiator of a fast payment starts by selecting eligible routers that are capable of handling the upcoming fast payment. We define a money circuit as the set of peers that are involved in a fast payment. This set contains at least one initiator and one beneficiary, and optionally one or more money routers. A money circuit that contains n money routers, is called a n-hop circuit. Building a money circuit proceeds in a depthfirst manner and starts with the initiator selecting a router, say r, that is capable of routing money to another account. Next, the initiator sends an extend message to r which contains the payment volume and the destination bank account of the fast payment. r responds with a boolean that indicates whether r has sufficient funds to handle the transfer. The response also includes a list of routers that are able to extend the money circuit, and the transaction fee charged by r. If r is able to handle the transfer, the initiator picks a router to extend the circuit with and sends an extend message again. These routers are picked based on trustworthiness scores. This process repeats until the initiator built a money circuit that can handle the fast payment. Users are able to change the maximum number of routers in a circuit, which defaults to 3.
The trust model discussed in Section V is based purely on past transactions. It is useful to consider other properties when picking eligible money routers, such as transaction fees, availability, reliability or network latency. Depending on the situation, one might favour low network latency or competitive transaction fees over trustworthiness.
Transferring Money: We now elaborate the process of transferring money over a n-hop circuit. If n = 0, money is sent directly to the beneficiary using exactly one in-house payment and no money routers. A single sent transaction is created between the fast payment initiator and beneficiary.
When a money circuit involves one or more money routers (n ≥ 1), the fast payment is facilitated by intermediaries. Let r i indicate the i-th router in the circuit (r 1 represents the first router). The initiator starts by sending a message to r 1 , containing the payment volume and all subsequent routers involved in the money circuit, including the final beneficiary of the fast payment. Next, the initiator initiates a commit transaction with r 1 and sends the money. r 1 now starts to poll for the money and finally constructs a sent transaction when funds are observed. r 1 forwards the funds to the next router or the beneficiary and this process repeats until the money arrives in the bank account of the beneficiary. The final transfer to the beneficiary does only result in a sent transaction. Thus, a fast payment with n intermediaries results in 2n + 1 new records.
Risk Mitigation: In addition to our trust model, we propose two risk mitigation techniques to reduce counterparty risk when using money routers: 1) Incremental settlement: A key risk mitigation technique is to avoid making a single, large payment at once. Instead, a payment is divided into n smaller interbank payments. While this increases duration of a fast payment by a factor n, it significantly reduces risk and incentives for intermediaries to compromise money. We believe that reduced risk for some increased latency is a desirable trade-off in Internet-of-Money. 2) Multi-flow payments: We uniformly divide a fast payment amongst multiple, distinct money circuits. This results in smaller payments through intermediaries. While these individual strategies are viable to mitigate counterparty risk, combining them results in a significant reduction of the value at stake, at the cost of additional latency and communication overhead. We evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies in Section VII-B.
Router Recharging: Since funds arrive in one account and leave another, money routers might become insolvent at one point in time, unable to route additional funds. This can be addressed by handling fast payments going in the opposite direction, which restores account balances. However, initiation of these fast payments is outside the control of money routers. Balances can also be restored by initiating a payment from the account with excessive balance to the other bank account. Since this involves an inter-bank payment, settlement might be slow and in turn, this negatively impacts router availability. We envision an infrastructure where routers help each other to restore balances, effectively creating a two-sided market with capacity supply and demand. For instance, a router can offer PayPal capacity in return for HSBC funds. While this is an efficient method to restore balances, only requiring inhouse payments, we consider the design and implementation of such a mechanism as future work.
VII. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We now evaluate the performance of money routers, speed of router discovery within Internet-of-Money and the effectiveness of our trust model.
A. Performance of Money Routing
This section concentrates on the performance of fast payments using money routers. All these experiments are conducted with real bank accounts and real money.
Settlement duration of in-house payments:
To determine settlement duration of in-house payments for each bank, we send e0.01 ten times between two accounts with different holders, within the same bank. By adding a unique identifier to the description field of a payment, we are able to track payments and accurately measure settlement times. The experiment is executed with two clients on two different computers, with a polling interval of 500 milliseconds, to avoid hammering the bank servers. Polling starts when the payment request has been finished by the sending party. The results are shown in Figure  5 , with a non-linear vertical axis. Only one bank, ABN AMRO, has sub-second settlement times with an average duration of 320 milliseconds. ING is slower with 1109 milliseconds on average. PayPal and Rabobank show settlement durations that are an order of magnitude slower, averaging to 4.82 and 7.61 seconds respectively. When performing measurements for the Rabobank, we observed a notable outlier with a settlement time of 320 milliseconds. This observation can be explained if we assume that similar internal payments might be handled in different ways by the Rabobank. This experiment demonstrates that in-house payments are usually settled within seconds.
International Real-time Money Routing: Next, we focus on the performance of an international fast payment and measure the duration of a money transfer from Rabobank to ABN AMRO, using two money routers. This experiment aims to show the viability and speed of Internet-of-Money. Figure 8 shows the experimental setup and timeline of our experiment.
First, an initiator sends funds from his or her Rabobank account to the first router (holding an account at Rabobank and PayPal), and informs it about the sent funds. Next, the first router starts polling for incoming funds, with an interval of 500 milliseconds. When the first router observes the funds, it forwards them to the second router (holding an account at PayPal and ABN AMRO) and informs this router. When the second router observes the funds, it forwards the money from it's ABN AMRO account to the ABN AMRO account of the beneficiary. In total, three in-house payments are made, with six different bank accounts.
From Figure 8 , we conclude that it takes 15.85 seconds in total for money to arrive in the bank account of a beneficiary when using two intermediate routers. A significant amount of time is spent on waiting for the funds to arrive in the PayPal account of the second router, around 6 seconds or 38% of the total duration. The average time to perform a payment is 2.14 seconds and initiation of payments take 41% of the total duration. The average time that a transaction is in transit is 3.02 seconds. The total time to perform a fast payment is heavily influenced by the type and number of intermediate routers. This experiment demonstrates that Internet-of-Money is capable of real-time money routing to other banks.
B. Overlay Evaluation
The purpose of the following experiments is to quantify the performance of our money router overlay. This includes an evaluation of our trust model and effectiveness of fraud detection. We implemented our trust model and Internet-ofMoney overlay network in the Python programming language. Our implementation is built upon the Dispersy framework, providing primitives for peer discovery, decentralized communication and secure messaging [24] .
Experimental Setup: The following real-world emulations are executed on the DAS-5 supercomputer, using 50 instances per node [25] . We deploy our experiment using the Gumby framework and we create a scenario file where we schedule actions at specific times. All code used during these experiments is open source 3 . Due to the limited number of accounts we own and to avoid a large load on the banking infrastructure, simulated accounts are used during this experiment. We assume a total of five different banks and devised a basic RESTful banking server that handles account creation, payments, balance queries and mutation requests. Distribution of bank accounts amongst users follows the data as published in the NGData customer banking survey (we assume that every user owns at least one bank account) [23] .
Router Discovery: We evaluate the efficiency of the router discovery protocol discussed in Section VI. During the experiment, we record the connected peers for each user at a fixed interval (every 5 seconds). We determine whether this user is capable of transferring money to all five different bank accounts, using at most one, two and three intermediate money routers respectively. Figure 6 shows the performance of router discovery in the Internet-of-Money overlay. The horizontal axis denotes the time into the experiment. The vertical axis indicates the percentage of users that are able to make fast payment to all five banks, or are fully connected. We vary the maximum number of routers in a money circuit. As expected, it takes longer before users are able to build circuits to all other banks using only one router, compared to three routers. However, the differences are marginal. In general, router discovery happens fast: 50% of all users are able to make fast payments to all banks within 25 seconds after the experiment starts. 40 seconds into the experiment, this percentage increased to 90%. Note that it takes longer before all users are fully connected using at most one intermediate router: 140 seconds.
Fraud Detection: Our final experiment focusses on the effectiveness of fraud detection (see Section V). To this end, we emulated 200 users with one or more bank accounts. Every five seconds, each user with a single account initiates a fast payment to another entity that has exactly one account of a different type. This forces a money router in the established circuits. The volume of each fast payment is picked from a uniform random distribution between e0.01 and e1000. We challenge ourselves and assume that every user with at least two different bank accounts is malicious and has a 50% probability of committing fraud and not forwarding received funds during a fast payment. To improve router availability, we connect all peers together before the experiment starts. In total, we schedule payments which volume sums to e1,251,848.35.
The results are shown in Figure 7 . The horizontal axis denotes the time into the experiment in seconds, after users start performing fast payments to each other. The vertical axis shows the total amount of committed fraud in Euro. We run the experiment four times with different risk mitigation strategies, namely incremental settlement (we split each fast payment in five equal parts) and/or multi-flow payments. The figure hints that the amount of fraud is capped and that malicious routers are successfully excluded from money circuits. Without any risk migration strategy, malicious routers are able to steal e1,544 on average during the whole experiment, indicating that fraudulent routers are able to commit fraud multiple times. This can be addressed to the fact that they are included in multiple money circuits roughly at the same time. If we consider risk mitigation strategies, we see that the combination of multi-flow payments and incremental settlement leads to the lowest amount of fraud possible, on average e174. Using exclusively incremental settlement leads to a slightly higher amount of fraud.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We now discuss this research from various perspectives. Legal: The idea of directly sharing funds with others, without a central bank involved, challenges existing regulation.
Routing money through other bank accounts resembles activity performed by financial settlement institutions and might require a legal prerequisite in the form of a banking license. The PSD2 regulation states that trusted third parties (TPPs) can be authorized by end-users to perform financial activities on their behalf [20] . However, it is unclear whether the definition of a TPP includes money routers. Another consideration is responsibility when a mistaken payment is initiated. Finally, compatibility of our system with (inter)national anti-money laundry regulations is uncertain. Exploring legal compliance of this work is a fundamental requirement for broader adoption.
Limitations: While we have proven the viability of our idea, there are several limitations that must be addressed prior to broader adoption. We noticed that banks are not used to our dynamic way of initiating money transfers and our accounts got blocked several times due to suspected fraudulent behaviour. An open ecosystem for settlement demands changes by banks and it is an open question whether they are willing to do so. On the other hand, many banks are already forced to innovate their legacy systems to remain competitive [15] .
Additionally, we observed that some banks require twofactor authentication when transferring funds to unknown bank accounts. This limits automation of money transfers since a manual action by the user is required for a payment to proceed.
Privacy: We consider privacy an important requirement of our open platform and expose minimal information about money flows. The current privacy model in Internet-of-Money is effective but open for extension. Decentralized path-based transaction networks, for instance, SpeedyMurmurs, aim to solve this specific problem [26] .
Scalability: Our overlay network is scalable, due to the absence of global consensus. However, techniques like incremental settlement lead to additional payments and a higher load on the banks. In addition, the choice of reputation mechanism used in Internet-of-Money influences scalability.
IX. RELATED WORK
The last few years, there has been a steep increase in Fintech start-ups, eager to disrupt existing financial services. Hawala is an informal system to transfer value, without actually moving money [27] . It consists of a network of hawala brokers, that take a small commission. In contrast to our system, trust in hawala is cultivated in an analogue manner whereas our model depends on a digital solution.
Innovation in the financial sector has been catalysed by the popularity of Blockchain technology, aiming to build trust between strangers without involvement of centralized authorities. Bitcoin has proven that a sustainable currency can be built without a central bank in control [2] . However, wide-spread adoption stays out due to its volatile pricing, high transaction fees, relatively slow confirmation times and unsure future. The Lightning Network aims to improve scalability of Bitcoin by providing bi-directional payment channels between users [28] . Payments between two users not directly connected with a payment channel, are realised by routing payments through channels of other users. This has similarities with money routing in Internet-of-Money. New usages of blockchain technology are focussed around the way users transfer money and other assets. The Ripple project, supported by various major banks, attempts to build a connected network of financial institutions and payment providers [29] . Their solution aims to significantly speed up traditional money transfers, lower costs and provide support for high-volume transactions. R3 Corda can be compared to Trustchain since they share the idea that a ledger with global consistency is often not necessary [30] .
While blockchain solutions are slowly being adopted, the aforementioned systems all aim to increase utility by building a financial network from scratch. In comparison, Internet-ofMoney is built upon existing, proven infrastructure, making migration towards our system effortless.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We explored a new stage in the evolution of digital trust and addressed the problem of trusting strangers with your money. The tamper-proof Trustchain structure provides a scalable and public trace of historical interactions, and allows detection and punishment of potential fraud. We expand upon this with an overlay network to transfer money within seconds to others, using other network participants as financial intermediaries. This mechanism depends on the fast settlement of inhouse payments. Our open ecosystem dramatically improves speed when initiating cross-border payments while preserving privacy and scalability. Our experiments demonstrated the efficiency of in-house payments and effectiveness of money routers. Additionally, we have proven that our fraud detection mechanism, together with incremental settlement and multiflow payments, limits misuse and punishes malicious behaviour. However, there are various legal issues and limitations that should be addressed, mostly by financial institutions, before broader usage can be realised.
This work is an important milestone in our ambitious vision to create the programmable economy. Ongoing work towards this goal addresses self-sovereign identity, scalable blockchain consensus compatible with Trustchain, and decentralized marketplaces. We refer the interested reader to our scientific overview article [16] .
